A Comparative Analysis of Influenza Vaccination Programs by Bansal, Shweta et al.
A Comparative Analysis of Influenza
Vaccination Programs
Shweta Bansal
1
, Babak Pourbohloul
2
, Lauren Ancel Meyers
3,4*
1 Computational and Applied Mathematics, University of Texas Austin, Austin, Texas, United States of America, 2 UBC Centre for Disease Control, University of British
Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, 3 Section of Integrative Biology and Institute for Cellular and Molecular Biology, University of Texas Austin, Austin, Texas,
United States of America, 4 External Faculty, Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, New Mexico, United States of America
Funding: We acknowledge the
financial support of the Canadian
Institutes of Health Research, the
Santa Fe Institute, and a NASA
Harriett G. Jenkins Fellowship to SB.
The funding agencies had no role in
study design, data collection and
analysis, decision to publish, or
preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors
have declared that no competing
interests exist.
Academic Editor: Bryan Grenfell,
Pennsylvania State University,
United States of America
Citation: Bansal S, Pourbohloul B,
Meyers LA (2006) A comparative
analysis of influenza vaccination
programs. PLoS Med 3(10): e387.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030387
Received: October 13, 2005
Accepted: July 13, 2006
Published: October 3, 2006
DOI:
10.1371/journal.pmed.0030387
Copyright:  2006 Bansal et al. This
is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License, which
permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original
author and source are credited.
Abbreviations: CDC, United States
Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention
* To whom correspondence should
be addressed. E-mail: laurenmeyers@
mail.utexas.edu
A B S T R A C T
Background
The threat of avian influenza and the 2004–2005 influenza vaccine supply shortage in the
United States have sparked a debate about optimal vaccination strategies to reduce the burden
of morbidity and mortality caused by the influenza virus.
Methods and Findings
We present a comparative analysis of two classes of suggested vaccination strategies:
mortality-based strategies that target high-risk populations and morbidity-based strategies that
target high-prevalence populations. Applying the methods of contact network epidemiology
to a model of disease transmission in a large urban population, we assume that vaccine
supplies are limited and then evaluate the efficacy of these strategies across a wide range of
viral transmission rates and for two different age-specific mortality distributions.
We find that the optimal strategy depends critically on the viral transmission level
(reproductive rate) of the virus: morbidity-based strategies outperform mortality-based
strategies for moderately transmissible strains, while the reverse is true for highly transmissible
strains. These results hold for a range of mortality rates reported for prior influenza epidemics
and pandemics. Furthermore, we show that vaccination delays and multiple introductions of
disease into the community have a more detrimental impact on morbidity-based strategies
than mortality-based strategies.
Conclusions
If public health officials have reasonable estimates of the viral transmission rate and the
frequency of new introductions into the community prior to an outbreak, then these methods
can guide the design of optimal vaccination priorities. When such information is unreliable or
not available, as is often the case, this study recommends mortality-based vaccination priorities.
The Editors’ Summary of this article follows the references.
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Introduction
In response to the 2004–2005 influenza vaccine shortage,
the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) restricted vaccines to those most at risk for hospital-
ization and death — healthy infants, elderly individuals, and
individuals with chronic illnesses. This strategy may be limited
by the failure of vaccines to yield adequate protection for
high-risk individuals [1,2] and the lesser roles played by infants
and the elderly in disease transmission—they typically do not
introduce influenza into households or other social groups.
Influenza outbreaks are believed to hinge, instead, on
transmission by healthy school children [3–6], college
students, and employed adults who have many daily contacts
and are highly mobile [7]. Thus, epidemiologists have
suggested an alternative approach: vaccinate school-age
children to slow the spread of disease and thereby indirectly
decrease mortality [8,9]. Several studies support this strategy.
Monto et al. immunized school children in Tecumseh,
Michigan, with inactivated influenza vaccine in 1968 and
found lower total morbidity than in a matching community
during a wave of influenza A (H3N2) [10]. Reichart et al. argue
that mandatory influenza vaccination of school children in
Japan from 1962 to 1987 reduced incidence and mortality
among the elderly [11]. Recently, Longini et al. used
mathematical models to show that, under certain assump-
tions, vaccinating 80% of all school-age children is almost as
effective as vaccinating 80% of the entire population [8].
School-based vaccination programs have the additional
benefits of high coverage, high efficacy, and minimal side
effects [12].
In a similar spirit, others have suggested contact-based
priorities that target individuals with the highest numbers of
potentially disease-causing contacts [13–15]. This assumes
that vulnerability is directly proportional to the number of
contacts, and that removing the most vulnerable individuals
from the transmission chain will maximally decrease disease
spread. Identifying high-contact individuals in a community,
however, may be difficult in practice.
Here we apply tools from contact network epidemiology
[16–19] to evaluate vaccination strategies for a spectrum of
influenza strains when vaccine supplies are limited. We use a
realistic model of contact patterns in an urban setting to
compare mortality-based strategies that target high-risk
individuals to morbidity-based strategies that target demo-
graphics with high attack rates. We assess the efficacy of these
measures for two substantially different virulence patterns,
one based on mortality estimates from annual influenza
epidemics and the other based on mortality estimates from
the 1918 influenza pandemic. In addition, we consider the
impact of vaccination delay and multiple imported cases on
the relative effectiveness of the vaccination strategies.
Methods
Population Model
We built a contact network model that captures the
interactions that underlie respiratory disease transmission
within a city. The model is based on demographic informa-
tion for Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. In the model,
each person is represented as a vertex, and interactions
between people are represented as edges between appropri-
ate vertices. Each person is assigned an age based on
Vancouver census data, and age-appropriate activities
(school, work, hospital, etc.). Interactions among individuals
reflect household size, employment, school, and hospital data
for Vancouver. The model population includes ;257,000
individuals. For further details and sensitivity analysis, see
Protocol S1 and Figures S1 and S2.
Our contact network model contains undirected edges that
reflect the possibility of disease transmission in either
direction between two individuals, and directed edges that
indicate the possibility of disease transmission from one
person to another, but not the reverse (see Figure 1). Directed
Figure 1. Network Model
(A) A schematic of a network model for an urban population. Each individual is a vertex in the network, and edges represent potentially disease-causing
contacts between individuals. Directed edges (with arrows) represent transmission occurring in only one direction.
(B) We model vaccination in a population by removing nodes from the population network, and the edges that are attached to them.
HCW, health-care worker.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030387.g001
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edges model the possibility of transmission from an infected
member of the general public to health-care workers during
hospital visits. In a typical epidemic, most individuals infected
with influenza do not seek hospital care. We assume that only
high-risk groups (infants and elderly) visit hospitals upon
infection and thus have opportunities to infect the health-care
workers who treat them [20]. We also consider a more extreme
scenario in which almost all infected individuals are at risk for
serious complications and thus seek medical care upon
infection.
Influenza Mortality
Mortality rates differ both across demographic groups and
among strains of influenza (see Table 1 and Protocol S1), and
thus the optimal vaccination priorities are likely to depend
on the virulence of the circulating strains. We consider two
substantially different mortality models. The first assumes
age-specific mortality rates typical of interpandemic out-
breaks of flu, which are based on national viral surveillance
data reported for 1977–1999 [21]. The rate is highest for the
elderly, followed by infants, who are most at risk for death
caused directly by influenza or pneumonia or by primary
respiratory or circulatory complications. The second model,
which was intentionally chosen for contrast, assumes mortal-
ity rates to be as estimated for the 1918 flu pandemic. These
are high for healthy young adults aged 20–40 y and children
under 5 y and low for older children and the elderly [22]
(Table 1). There are, however, conflicting estimates for the
elderly [23,24]. We use a low estimate to achieve the greatest
departure from the interpandemic model, and thus to
ascertain the sensitivity of our results to assumptions about
influenza mortality. Henceforth, we refer to these two models
as interpandemic and pandemic, respectively. We consider
other reported mortality rates in Protocol S1 and Figure S3.
Vaccine Priorities
We modeled targeted pre-season vaccination with single
doses of inactivated influenza vaccine by removing select
individuals (vertices) and all their contacts (edges) from the
network before predicting the spread of influenza (see Figure
1). The fraction of the vaccinated population that becomes
fully protected is based on demographic-specific vaccine
efficacy estimates (Table 2). For a vaccine of efficacy E and
coverage C for a particular group, we remove a fraction CE of
individuals from that group. This assumes that this fraction is
fully protected (100% effectiveness) while the remaining
fraction C(1 E) of vaccinated individuals are not protected
at all. In reality, most of the vaccinated individuals will enjoy
some partial protection. We have tested our method with
simulations to confirm that it provides a reasonable model
for partial efficacy (see Protocol S1 and Figure S5).
We evaluate four strategies (Figure 2): (1) a mortality-based
strategy that, like the recent CDC strategy, targets demo-
graphics that are most vulnerable to health complications or
death (infants, the elderly, and health-care workers for
interpandemic flu; and infants, adults, and health-care
workers for pandemic flu); (2) a morbidity-based strategy,
similar to the priorities suggested by Longini et al [8] and
Monto et al.[10], that targets school-aged children and school
staff, and thereby aims to reduce mortality through herd
protection [25]; (3) a mixed strategy that targets demo-
graphics with high attack rates (children) and high mortality
Table 1. The Age-Specific Mortality Distributions for Typical Annual Influenza Epidemics and an Example Influenza Pandemic
Group Mortality Rate for Influenza
Epidemic(per 10,000 Cases)
Mortality Rate for Influenza
Pandemic (per 10,000 Cases)
Infants and toddlers (6 mo–3 y) 0.30 80.0
Preschool children (3–5 y) 0.08 50.0
Children (5–18 y) 0.08 20.0
Adults (18–50 y) 0.07 70.0
Elders (.50 y) 12.00 5.0
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030387.t001
Table 2. Historical Influenza Vaccination Coverage Levels and Inactivated Vaccine Efficacy Levels Used in This Study
Group Vaccination Coverage Levels Inactivated Vaccine Efficacy
Infants and toddlers (6 mo–3 y) 30%–75% 70%–90%
Preschool children (3–5 y) 30%–75% 70%–90%
Children (5–18 y) 30%–75% 77%–91%
Adults (18–50 y) 30%–75% 70%–90%
Elders (.50 y) 67%–85% 30%–50%
Health-care workers 25%–38% 70%–90%
Elders in care facilities 90%–95% 30%–50%
Sources: [12,26].
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030387.t002
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rates (infants and the elderly for interpandemic flu; infants
and adults for pandemic flu), similar to that suggested by
Longini and Halloran [9]; and (4) a contact-based strategy
that removes a fraction of the most connected individuals.
We modeled the mortality-based strategy by removing
infants, the elderly, and health-care workers from the
network based on reported maximum coverage and efficacy
levels for these demographics [12,26] (Table 2). This yielded
13% coverage of the total population (Table 3). We then
implemented the remaining strategies to match this overall
coverage level. (We consider the sensitivity of our results to
the coverage level in Protocol S1 and Figure S4.) Targeted
groups were removed in proportion to demographic-specific
vaccine coverage levels reported in the 2002 National Health
Interview Survey by the CDC [26], and the vaccine efficacy
levels were based on age-specific rates reported for inacti-
vated influenza vaccine [12].
Epidemiological Analysis
We define the transmissibility of a disease, T, as the average
probability that an infectious individual will transmit the
disease to a susceptible individual with whom he or she has
contact. This term summarizes important features of disease
propagation including the contact rates among individuals,
the duration of the infectious period, and the per contact
probability of transmission. This per contact probability of
transmission, in turn, summarizes the susceptibility (immune
response) and the infectiousness (viral shedding) of individ-
uals. Our analysis allows for variation in transmission rates
from one individual to the next, but it assumes that these
rates vary randomly with respect to the underlying contact
patterns. There is evidence, however, that transmission rates
may vary systematically among demographics, and, in
particular, may be highest for children [27]. In Protocol S1
and Figure S6, we consider modified models that explicitly
Figure 2. Vaccination Strategies
The demographic distribution of vaccines according to each of the strategies: the black bars reflect the fraction of available vaccines given to each age
group (and thus will always sum to one). The gray bars reflect the proportion of each demographic that is effectively immunized, and thus take into
account the size of the demographic and the demographic-specific vaccine efficacy.
HCW, health-care worker.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030387.g002
Table 3. Vaccination Coverage and Efficacy Levels Assumed for the Mortality-Based Vaccination Strategy
Group Implemented Coverage Level Vaccine Efficacy Effective Coverage Level
Infants and toddlers (6 mo–3 y) 75% (4.1% of total population) 90% 68%
Elders (.50 y) 85% (7.5% of total population) 50% 43%
Health-care workers 38% (0.4% of total population) 90% 34%
Elders in care facilities 95% (0.7% of total population) 50% 48%
Total 12.7% of total population
The effective coverage level is a product of the implemented coverage level and the vaccine efficacy for each group.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030387.t003
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capture such demographic-specific variation in transmission
rates and show that this additional complexity does not alter
the results reported below.
T is linearly related to the key epidemiological parameter
R0. In particular, R0 is equal to Tj, where j is a measure of the
connectivity within the population (network) [19,28]. Intui-
tively, R0 is largest for highly contagious pathogens (repre-
sented by a high T) spreading through densely connected
populations (represented by a high j). R0¼1 corresponds to a
critical transmissibility value Tc, above which a population is
vulnerable to large-scale epidemics and below which only
small outbreaks occur [28].
We used methods based on contact network epidemiology
[16–19] to predict the fate of an influenza outbreak as a
function of the average transmissibility T of the strain. For any
contact network, one can mathematically predict the epi-
demic threshold (Tc), the average size of a small outbreak (s),
the average size (Se) and probability (Pe) of a large-scale
epidemic, and demographic-specific attack rates for an
epidemic, should one occur. Mortality is predicted by multi-
plying the expected number of infections for a given group by
the age-specific mortality rate assumed for that group. (See
Protocol S1 for additional details.)
To verify these mathematical predictions, we performed
numerical simulations of disease spread assuming a simple
susceptible–infectious–recovered (SIR) model. Beginning with
a susceptible network and a single infected case, we iteratively
take each currently infected vertex, infect each of its
susceptible contacts with probability T, and then change the
status of the original vertex to ‘‘recovered.’’ These simulations
are generally consistent with the mathematical calculations
(Figure 3), and thus we primarily report the analytical results.
Immunity from prior outbreaks is an important aspect of
interpandemic influenza transmission. There are two alter-
native approaches to modeling residual immunity. One is to
remove individuals with naturally acquired immunity from
the network, as we have done for vaccination. The other is to
assume that the distribution of transmission probabilities
reflects pre-existing immunity. If there is widespread partial
immunity, then there will be large numbers of edges along
which transmission is very unlikely, leading to a lower average
transmissibility across the population. Here we have not
removed individuals with naturally acquired immunity from
the population, but instead assume that the transmissibility
values are averaged over all edges in the network, including
those leading to or from such individuals.
Model Validation
We compared the age-specific attack rates predicted by our
models to those reported for both interpandemic flu and the
1918 pandemic (Figure 4). First, we considered data from the
interpandemic outbreak of 1977–1978 reported by Longini et
al. [3]. They reported age-specific attack rates from a
household study of 159 families in Seattle, Washington,
United States, in which infection was determined through
hemagglutination-inhibition assays. We do not know the
exact age-specific influenza vaccination coverage rates during
this period. We assumed that the population was protected
according the current CDC strategy (the mortality-based
strategy), and then used our model to predict demographic-
specific attack rates. We estimated the average transmissi-
Figure 3. Morbidity and Mortality for Influenza Epidemics and Pandemics
Expected (A) attack rate and (B) mortality rate as a function of T for annual influenza epidemics.
Expected (C) attack rate and (D) mortality rate as a function of T for an influenza pandemic.
The dots in (A) show simulation results for comparison. Estimates of R0 for interpandemic and pandemic flu are shown as gray lines in (B) and (D),
respectively.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030387.g003
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bility of the disease by solving for the value of T that produces
the observed total attack rate (T¼ 0.07, or R0¼ 1.2). Thus, the
total attack rate was constrained to match perfectly the
observed total attack rate, while the demographic-specific
attack rates were free to vary. The predictions of the model
are consistent with the observed epidemiology (Figure 4A).
We note, however, that the reliability of this comparison is
limited by the small sample size of the Seattle study and the
lack of information about vaccine coverage and efficacy
during that period.
Second, we made a similar comparison using age-specific
attack rate data for the 1918 pandemic that were collected
and reported by Frost in 1920 [29]. The data are based on a
survey of approximately 146,000 people (representing a
cross-section of the US population, which at the time
numbered 103 million). Infection rates for influenza were
based on self-reported responses by study participants. There
was no vaccination available for influenza at the time in the
US, and thus we made epidemiological predictions assuming
no vaccination. Again, we began by solving for an average
transmissibility that produces the observed total attack rate
and found T¼ 0.09 (or R0¼ 1.8). As a consistency check, this
estimate agrees very closely with the recently revised estimate
for the pandemic influenza reproductive rate [30], based on
US and UK 1918 pandemic mortality data. Assuming this
average transmissibility, we predicted demographic-specific
attack rates and found that they matched the observed
patterns reasonably well (Figure 4B).
Results/Discussion
Direct versus Indirect Intervention Methods
For interpandemic influenza, morbidity-based and contact-
based strategies appear to offer significant indirect protec-
tion of unvaccinated individuals who would otherwise
become infected via transmission chains that have now been
severed by vaccination. Indeed, for all strains, these two
strategies are predicted to yield the lowest attack rates (Figure
3A). If the primary objective is to reduce morbidity from
influenza, then the morbidity-based and contact-based
strategies are always preferred, although their advantage
decreases as disease transmissibility (T) increases.
One might argue that the primary objective of intervention
should be to reduce mortality rather than morbidity. The
CDC’s recent vaccine priorities seem to be based on this
objective [12]. In terms of mortality, there is a specific
transmissibility value below which the morbidity-based and
contact-based strategies are superior and above which the
mortality-based strategies are superior (Figure 3B). To clarify
this transition (which occurs for our network at T¼ 0.13), we
show in Figure 5 the proportions of the adult and elderly
subpopulations that are infected, vaccinated, and uninfected
for the two strategies at two values of T. The uninfected class
is made up of individuals that have neither been vaccinated
nor get infected. Some of these individuals would not be
infected in any case, and the rest are those that would be
infected without a vaccination program but are now
protected by the effects of herd immunity. Below the
transition point (for instance, at T ¼ 0.1), the elderly are
protected more by the indirect effects of the morbidity-based
strategy than by the direct effects of the mortality-based
strategy. Above the transition point (for instance, at T¼0.15),
the indirect protection by the morbidity-based strategy drops
substantially, resulting in a higher proportion of elderly
individuals infected than with the mortality-based strategy. A
similar reversal occurs for infants. The mixed strategy—a
combination of the morbidity-based and mortality-based
strategies—is never the optimal strategy (Figure 3B), yet may
Figure 4. Model Validation
Comparison of predicted to observed age-specific attack rates for (A) the 1977–1978 influenza season and (B) the 1918 influenza pandemic.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030387.g004
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be an advisable bet-hedging strategy when there is great
uncertainty about the transmissibility of the circulating
strain.
Estimates of R0 for interpandemic flu range between 1.0
and 2.4 for the A (H2N2) and A (H3N2) strains of influenza
([31,32] and references therein). Since influenza vaccines have
been used in the US since 1944, these estimates may be based
on partially vaccinated populations. Conservatively assuming
that the populations in question had somewhere between no
coverage at all and 13% coverage according to the contact-
based strategy, these values of R0 (1.0 , R0 , 2.4) correspond
to 0.06 , T , 0.26 in our model (See Protocol S1.) This range
straddles the critical cross-points in Figure 3B, leaving some
ambiguity as to which strategy will be most effective. We note,
however, that the higher the transmissibility, the more dire
the public health situation, and mortality-based strategies are
predicted to be more effective for highly contagious strains.
Highly Virulent Influenza
The demographic-specific mortality rates reported for
influenza vary considerably (Protocol S1 and Figure S3). To
assess whether control recommendations can be generalized
to new or anomalous strains of influenza, we analyzed a
second, extreme scenario. Worldwide influenza pandemics
are characterized by much higher levels of morbidity and
mortality than annual epidemics, and have occurred three
times in the last century. The 1918–1919 ‘‘Spanish Influenza’’
caused more than 500,000 deaths in the US and an estimated
20 million deaths worldwide [33]. Based on data from the
1918 pandemic, we modified our model in three respects: the
number of people expected to seek medical attention upon
infection, the age-specific mortality rates, and (consequen-
tially) the age groups targeted by the mortality-based and
mixed strategies.
Despite these substantial differences, the predictions for
pandemic and interpandemic flu are qualitatively similar.
The morbidity-based and contact-based strategies outper-
form mortality-based strategies in terms of resulting mortal-
ity for low values of T, but not for higher values. There is a
quantitative difference, however, in that the transition point
between these two regimes happens at a higher transmissi-
bility for pandemic flu than for interpandemic flu (Figure 3D
versus 3B). In other words, morbidity-based strategies are
preferred for a wider spectrum of pandemic flu strains than
of interpandemic flu strains. This stems, in part, from the
much larger size of the high-risk population (adults) for
pandemic flu. Under vaccine limitations (13% in this case),
the mortality-based strategy protects a much smaller fraction
of the pandemic high-risk population than of the interpan-
demic high-risk population. We have found that increasing
the vaccination level to 20% does not change the qualitative
results (shown in Protocol S1 and Figure S4). Patel et al. have
recently performed a similar sensitivity analysis on vaccine
availability [34].
The reproductive number (R0) for the 1918 Spanish
Influenza is estimated to have been between 1.8 and 4.0
[29,35], corresponding to T between 0.09 and 0.43 in our
model (see Protocol S1). Once again, this range straddles the
critical cross-point in Figure 3D, leaving some ambiguity as to
which strategy will be most effective. It can be seen, however,
that mortality-based strategies are predicted to be more
effective across the upper two-thirds of this interval.
Multiple Introductions
Most communities do not exist in isolation, and thus
experience multiple independent introductions of the virus
during a typical flu season. Many models of vaccination
strategies [8,9], however, ignore this possibility. To better
Figure 5. Direct versus Indirect Intervention
The figure shows the proportions of the adult and elderly populations that are infected, not infected (neither vaccinated nor infected), and vaccinated
for two different values of T for the mortality-based strategy versus the morbidity-based strategy.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030387.g005
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understand the probability and rates of new importations of
flu, one must consider a meta-population model that includes
connectivity among cities. Here we address the consequences
of multiple introductions, but not the likelihood of such
events in the first place. For mathematical simplicity, we
assumed that multiple independent introductions occur
simultaneously (and initial cases are chosen randomly) at
the start of an outbreak, which yields conservative estimates
of their detrimental impact. The probability of an epidemic
increases with the number of introductions for all strategies,
thereby reducing the advantage of the morbidity-based and
contact-based strategies for mildly transmissible strains. For
example, if there are four independent introductions of flu,
morbidity-based strategies are inferior to mortality-based
strategies above T¼0.12 (R0¼2.1). In contrast, this shift takes
place at T¼ 0.13 (R0¼ 2.3), when there is a single importation
of disease (Figure 6).
Delayed Intervention
A similar analysis provides insight into the impact of a
delay in intervention until after an outbreak is already in
progress, as occurred during the 2000–2001 flu season [36].
This scenario may also be particularly relevant to pandemic
influenza, for which vaccines may only become available well
into an outbreak, if at all. We simulate the implementation of
vaccination after a certain proportion of the population has
already been infected. We call this proportion ‘‘delay.’’ The
morbidity-based strategies are more sensitive to such delays
than mortality-based methods are (Figure 7). They are
predicted to be inferior above T ¼ 0.11 (R0 ¼ 1.9) if there is
Figure 7. The Epidemiological Impact of Delayed Vaccination
(A) The morbidity-based strategy is more effective than the mortality-based strategy when T is less than 0.13 only if there is there is no delay in
vaccination. When vaccines are given after 10% of the population has already been infected, the morbidity-based strategy becomes relatively less
effective (and is the preferred strategy only when T is less than 0.11).
(B) At T¼ 0.125, the morbidity-based strategy is superior to the mortality-based strategy when there is no delay, but inferior for any amount of delay.
Each of the values is an average taken across 500 epidemic simulations on the contact network.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030387.g007
Figure 6. The Epidemiological Impact of Multiple Introductions of Disease
(A) The morbidity-based strategy is more effective than the mortality-based strategy when T is less than 0.13 only if there is only a single introduction of
disease. With four introductions of disease, however, the morbidity-based strategy becomes less effective (and is the preferred strategy only when T is
less than 0.12.)
(B) At T¼ 0.125, the morbidity-based strategy is superior to the mortality-based strategy when there is a single introduction, but inferior when there is
more than one introduction.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030387.g006
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a 10% delay in vaccination, compared to T ¼ 0.13 (R0 ¼ 2.3)
when there is no delay.
Figures 6 and 7 suggest that a delay in vaccination may be
less detrimental than multiple introductions of disease into a
population. Multiple independent introductions of disease
provide multiple independent opportunities to spark a large-
scale epidemic. In the absence of vaccination, the probability
of an epidemic increases considerably as the number of
independent introductions increases (Protocol S1). In con-
trast, a delay in vaccination allows a single case to grow into a
connected cluster of cases, which are not independent of each
other with respect to the numbers and the identities of their
contacts. The probability of an epidemic increases with the
number of individuals in the initial cluster, but not as quickly
as it does with the addition of independent cases.
Conclusion
In this study, we have applied the analytical methods of
contact network epidemiology to evaluate current and
proposed influenza vaccination priorities. In contrast to
prior studies [9,34], we have modeled a relatively large
population and the entire spectrum of viral transmission
rates possible for influenza; in addition, we have accounted
for multiple introductions of disease and the possibility of a
delay in vaccination. The efficacy of mortality-based strat-
egies (like the CDC 2004 vaccination priorities [12]) and
morbidity-based strategies (like school-based vaccination
[8,9]) depend on (i) the transmissibility (reproductive num-
ber) of the strain, (ii) age-specific mortality rates, (iii) the
vulnerability of the community to multiple introductions,
and (iv) the timing of implementation. With respect to
minimizing mortality, mortality-based strategies are generally
preferred to morbidity-based strategies for strains with high
transmission rates and in communities experiencing either
delayed intervention or multiple introductions.
Thus, mortality-based strategies may be the prudent choice
for outbreaks of new or atypical strains of influenza, when
public health officials may not have reliable estimates for all
(or any) of the first three inputs, and vaccination may be
delayed. The predictions appear to hold for a range of age-
specific mortality distributions estimated for past outbreaks
of epidemic and pandemic flu. Although this suggests that
similar recommendations may be appropriate for pandemic
flu, they will be irrelevant in the very likely case that vaccines
are not available at the start of an outbreak.
If more precise estimates of the key inputs become available,
then this approach can be applied to design optimal (rather
than just prudent) priorities. To reduce the existing uncer-
tainty in estimates of influenza transmission and mortality
rates, we must improve surveillance methods for gathering
real-time data and develop new statistical methods for
examining data from both historical and future outbreaks, as
were developed to estimate R0 for SARS during the 2003
outbreaks [37]. Current estimates of flu transmission rates are
based primarily on compartmental models of disease trans-
mission ([31,32] and references therein). Some of the variation
in the estimates of R0 may stem from variation in contact
patterns among different populations rather than intrinsic
variation in the probability of disease transmission between
individuals who come in contact with one another. While
compartmental models often do not capture such contact
heterogeneity, contact network models allow one to factor out
variation in contact patterns when estimating transmission
rates. Thus, the development of better estimation methods
using contact network models may yield more accurate
estimates of some key epidemiological parameters.
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Editors’ Summary
Background. Influenza—a viral infection of the nose, throat, and airways
that is transmitted in airborne droplets released by coughing or
sneezing—is a serious public health threat. Most people recover quickly
from influenza, but some individuals, especially infants, old people, and
individuals with chronic health problems, can develop pneumonia and
die. In the US, seasonal outbreaks (epidemics) of flu cause an estimated
36,000 excess deaths annually. And now there are fears that avian
influenza might start a human pandemic—a global epidemic that could
kill millions. Seasonal outbreaks of influenza occur because flu viruses
continually change the viral proteins (antigens) to which the immune
system responds. ‘‘Antigenic drift’’—small changes in these proteins—
means that an immune system response that combats flu one year may
not provide complete protection the next winter. ‘‘Antigenic shift’’—
large antigen changes—can cause pandemics because communities
have no immunity to the changed virus. Annual vaccination with
vaccines based on the currently circulating viruses controls seasonal flu
epidemics; to control a pandemic, vaccines based on the antigenically
altered virus would have to be quickly developed.
Why Was This Study Done? Most countries target vaccination efforts
towards the people most at risk of dying from influenza, and to health-
care workers who are likely come into contact with flu patients. But is
this the best way to reduce the burden of illness (morbidity) and death
(mortality) caused by influenza, particularly at the start of a pandemic,
when vaccine would be limited? Old people and infants are much less
likely to catch and spread influenza than school children, students, and
employed adults, so could vaccination of these sections of the
population—instead of those most at risk of death—be the best way
to contain influenza outbreaks? In this study, the researchers used an
analytical method called ‘‘contact network epidemiology’’ to compare
two types of vaccination strategies: the currently favored mortality-based
strategy, which targets high-risk individuals, and a morbidity-based
strategy, which targets those segments of the community in which most
influenza cases occur.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find? Most models of disease
transmission assume that each member of a community is equally likely
to infect every other member. But a baby is unlikely to transmit flu to, for
example, an unrelated, housebound elderly person. Contact network
epidemiology takes the likely relationships between people into account
when modeling disease transmission. Using information from Vancouver,
British Columbia, Canada, on household size, age distribution, and
occupations, and other factors such as school sizes, the researchers built
a model population of a quarter of a million interconnected people. They
then investigated how different vaccination strategies controlled the
spread of influenza in this population. The optimal strategy depended on
the level of viral transmissibility—the likelihood that an infectious person
transmits influenza to a susceptible individual with whom he or she has
contact. For moderately transmissible flu viruses, a morbidity-based
vaccination strategy, in which the people most likely to catch the flu are
vaccinated, was more effective at containing seasonal and pandemic
outbreaks than a mortality-based strategy, in which the people most
likely to die if they caught the flu are vaccinated. For highly transmissible
strains, this situation was reversed. The level of transmissibility at which
this reversal occurred depended on several factors, including whether
vaccination was delayed and how many times influenza was introduced
into the community.
What Do These Findings Mean? The researchers tested their models by
checking that they could replicate real influenza epidemics and
pandemics, but, as with all mathematical models, they included many
assumptions about influenza in their calculations, which may affect their
results. Also, because the contact network used data from Vancouver,
their results might not be applicable to other cities, or to nonurban
areas. Nevertheless, their findings have important public health
implications. When there are reasonable estimates of the viral trans-
mission rate, and it is known how often influenza is being introduced
into a community, contact network models could help public health
officials choose between morbidity- and mortality-based vaccination
strategies. When the viral transmission rate is unreliable or unavailable
(for example, at the start of a pandemic), the best policy would be the
currently preferred strategy of mortality-based vaccination. More
generally, the use of contact network models should improve estimates
of how infectious diseases spread through populations and indicate the
best ways to control human epidemics and pandemics.
Additional Information. Please access these Web sites via the online
version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.
0030387.
 US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention information about
influenza for patients and professionals, including key facts on
vaccination
 US National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases feature on
seasonal, avian, and pandemic influenza
 World Health Organization fact sheet on influenza, with links to
information on vaccination
 UK Health Protection Agency information on seasonal, avian, and
pandemic influenza
 MedlinePlus entry on influenza
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SUPPLEMENTAL METHODS
Urban Contact Network Generation 
For this study, we generate plausible contact networks for an urban setting using demographic 
information for the Greater Vancouver Regional District, which is the third largest metropolitan 
area in Canada. We use publicly available data from sources such as Statistics Canada to 
estimate the distribution of ages, household sizes, school and classroom sizes, hospital 
occupancy, workplaces, and public spaces [S1-S4].  Qualitatively similar age and household size 
distributions are found for other cities in Canada ranging in population sizes from 120,000 to 4.6 
million [S5].  We begin assembling the urban network by choosing 100,000 households at 
random from the Vancouver household size distribution [S1], which yields approximately 
257,000 people according to a mean household size of approximately 2.6.  Based on ages 
assigned from the measured Vancouver age distribution [S2], each member of the population is 
assigned to activities: to schools according to school and class size distributions [S3]; to 
occupations according to (un)employment data; to hospitals as patients and caregivers according 
to hospital employment and bed data [S4]; to nursing homes according to nursing home 
occupancy data; and to other public places.  
To model heterogeneities in contact patterns, we create random connections (edges) 
between individuals (nodes) based on the location and nature of their overlapping daily activities.
Individuals in households are connected with probability 1, while individuals encountering 
others in public places are connected with probabilities ranging from 0.003 to 0.3.  Each school 
2and hospital is subdivided into classrooms or wards. Pairs of students and pairs of patients within 
these subunits are connected with higher probability than pairs associated with different subunits. 
Teachers are assigned to classrooms and connected stochastically to appropriate students. 
Caregivers are assigned wards and then connected to appropriate patients. There are also low 
probability neighborhood contacts between individuals from different households. 
Epidemiological Analysis
The methods described in this section are derived and described fully in Ref S6.  Here, we only 
present the epidemiological equations with a few motivating details.  Our contact network 
models are semi-directed – containing both undirected and directed edges.  In a semi-directed 
network, each vertex (individual) has an undirected-degree representing the number of 
undirected edges joining the vertex to other vertices as well as both an in-degree and an out-
degree representing the number of directed edges coming from other vertices and going to other
vertices, respectively. The undirected-degree and in-degree indicate how many contacts can 
spread disease to the individual, and thus is related to the likelihood that an individual will 
become infected during an epidemic; and the undirected-degree and out-degree indicate how 
many contacts may be infected by that individual should he or she become infected, and thus is 
related to the likelihood that an individual will ignite an epidemic. 
Given the degree distribution of the contact network within a population, one can 
analytically predict what will happen when an infectious disease like influenza enters the 
population. Let jkmp  be the probability that any given person in the population has in-degree 
equal to j, out-degree equal to k, and undirected-degree m.  Let T be the transmissibility of the 
disease, that is, the average probability that transmission of the disease occurs between an 
3infected individual and a susceptible individual with whom they are in contact. 
Network theory makes a technical distinction between outbreaks and epidemics.  An 
outbreak is a causally connected cluster of cases which, by chance or because the transmission 
probability is low, dies out before spreading to the population at large.  In an epidemic, on the 
other hand, the infection escapes the initial group of cases into the community at large and 
results in population-wide incidence of the disease. The crucial difference is that the size of an 
outbreak is determined by the spontaneous dying out of the infection, whereas the size of an 
epidemic is limited only by the size of the population through which it spreads. 
To predict the fate of an outbreak, we use probability generating functions, to summarize 
useful information about network topology.  Thus, if a graph has degree distribution jkmp , then 
the probability generating function (PGF, henceforth) for jkmp is
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If you choose a random directed edge in the network and follow it to the nearest 
vertex, then the PGF for the number of the three types of edges (in, out, and undirected) 
emanating from that vertex other than the one that we arrived on is 
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Likewise, if you choose a random undirected edge in the network and follow it to the nearest 
vertex, then the PGF for the various edges at that vertex is given by 
!
 
¦ 
un
jkm
mkj
jkm
u k
uyxmp
uyxH
1
),,(
.
 Using these methods, we can derive the reproductive ratio, R0, the average size of an 
outbreak, s , the size of an epidemic, eS , the probability of an epidemic, eP , and the probability 
that an individual with a certain (in- and undirected-) degree will become infected, jmv .
The basic reproductive ratio: When calculating the expected number of new cases arising from 
an infection in a naïve population we consider the source vertex of the infection.  That is, the 
initial case may arise through infection along a directed or undirected edge. Thus, if we know 
the source of the infection we can more accurately predict the R0. In particular, 
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0  respectively, where T is the average 
disease transmissibility and the second term is the average out-degree plus the average 
undirected-degree of a vertex that has become infected along a randomly selected edge. When 
we do not know anything about the transmission event that led to the initial infection, then our 
best estimate is  
R0  T
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5Since R0 is a product of both transmissibility (T) and the connectivity of the population, 
for a given value of T, different populations (networks) may have different values of R0.  If we 
are given range of R0 values for a certain population, p < R0 < q for example, we can derive the 
lower and upper bounds for transmissibility that correspond to that range of R0 as follows. 
Assuming we have no further information about the vaccination status of the population, we take 
the value of T that yields R0 = p for the population (network) with no vaccination (a worse-case 
scenario) and we take the value of T that yields R0 = q for the population (network) with 
maximum vaccination coverage (a best-case scenario.)  For interpandemic flu, R0 has been 
estimated to be 1 < R0 < 2.4.  For an unvaccinated population, R0 = 1 corresponds to T = 0.06 
and for a population with maximum vaccination coverage (13%), R0 = 2.4 corresponds to T = 
0.26.  Thus we estimate the transmissibility of interpandemic influenza to be 0.06 < T < 0.26. 
The average size of small outbreaks and the epidemic threshold: By nesting PGFs for the 
number of new infections emanating from an infected vertex one can construct a PGF for 
the size of a small outbreak, and hence derive the average size of a small outbreak: 
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f .  When T is small, the average size of a small outbreak is finite, but 
s  grows with increasing transmissibility, until it diverges when the denominator of the 
expression above reaches its first zero.  This point marks the phase transition at which the 
typical outbreak ceases to be confined to a finite number of cases and expands to a large-
scale epidemic covering most of the network.  This transition happens when T is equal to 
6the critical transmissibility cT , given by 
     
 kmmjmjmmmjkj
km
m
jm
j
mm
m
jk
j
mm
m
jk
j
mm
m
jk
j
c ffff
ffffffff
T

r
 

)1(
)1(2)1()1(
2
4
.
The expected size of a full-blown epidemic eS : We can compute the size of the epidemic (the 
proportion of the population infected), eS , for the case when T is larger than cT .  We first 
calculate the likelihood that infection of a randomly chosen individual will spark only a limited 
outbreak instead of a full-blown epidemic, and then take one minus that probability: 
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where a and b are the solutions to the self-consistent equations 
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numerical root finding methods (such as Newton’s method) to solve for a and b.
The probability of a full-blown epidemic eP : The expression for eP  comes from first calculating 
the likelihood that a single infection will lead to only a small outbreak instead of a full-blown 
epidemic, and then and then taking one minus the probability: 
Pe  1 pjkm (1 (D 1)T )
k (1 (E 1)T )m
jkm
¦ ,
where D and E are the solutions to the self-consistent equations 
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numerical root finding methods (such as Newton’s method) to solve for D and E.
7The probability that an individual will be infected during an epidemic jmv : The likelihood that 
an individual of in-degree j and undirected-degree m will be infected during an epidemic is 
equal to one minus the probability that none of his or her mj  contacts will transmit the 
disease to him or her. The average probability that an individual at the (origin) end of a 
randomly selected directed edge is spared by an epidemic is a. For an individual at the end of a 
randomly selected undirected edge, this probability is b.  Thus, the probability that one is not 
infected by a neighbor is the probability that the neighbor is infected but does not transmit 
disease (1-a)(1-T) for directed edges and (1-b)(1-T) for undirected edges, plus the probability 
that the neighbor is not infected, a for directed edges or b for undirected edges.  These 
probabilities sum to (1-T+Ta) and (1-T+Tb) for directed and undirected edges, respectively. 
Thus, a randomly chosen vertex of in-degree j and undirected-degree m will become infected 
with probability 
mj
jm TbTTaTv )1()1(1  .
Demographic-Specific Attack Rates:  We calculate demographic-specific epidemiological risks 
by combining demographic information (age, occupation, etc.) for each member of the 
population with the jmv , defined above.  We first divide the population into 14 demographic 
groups:
8Demographic Group (g) Demographic Group Description 
1 Infants (age < 3) 
2 Toddlers (3  age < 5) 
3 Children (5  age < 18) 
4 Adults (18  age < 50) 
5 Elderly ( age > 50) 
6 Nursing home residents 
7 Infants in daycare 
8 Toddlers in preschool 
9 Health care workers 
10 Nursing home workers 
11 Day care workers 
12 Preschool workers 
13 Teachers (and school staff) 
14 Unemployed 
For each demographic group (g), we find the expected number of infections ( gN ) at a 
particular transmission probability T by summing the probabilities of infection ( jmv ) across all 
individuals in that group. We denote the in-degree and undirected degree of an individual (i)
by )(ij and )(im , respectively: 
Ng  vj (i )m(i )
ig
¦  ]14,1[g .
Age-Specific Mortality:  The predicted number of deaths in the population caused by an 
epidemic (M) is the product of the predicted number of infections in each of the age groups 
(demographic groups 1 through 5 in the Table above) and the age-specific mortality rate ( gR )
specified in Table 3:  
5
1
*g g
g
M N R
 
 ¦
9The predicted total mortality rate for the population is M normalized by the population size. 
Multiple Introductions:  We can also analytically predict the probability of an epidemic given 
independent multiple introductions of disease into a population.  For a given number of 
introductions, n, the probability of an epidemic is given by: 
,)1(1 nen P ʌ
where, eP , is the probability of an epidemic assuming a single introduction.  We note that the 
calculation of nʌ above assumes that all n introductions occur independently at the outset of an 
outbreak.  This assumption yields an upper bound estimate for the probability of an epidemic 
with multiple introductions. 
Epidemic Simulation 
We verify the analytic predictions using simulations of a Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered (SIR) 
model.  The simulations are initialized with an entirely susceptible population, except for a single 
infected case (patient zero).  An infected vertex passes the disease on to each of its neighbors 
(those with whom that individual has disease-causing contacts) with probability T (the average 
transmission probability).  This process continues until the population no longer includes any 
susceptible individuals that are in contact with any infected individuals.  Once an individual has 
had the chance to infect its neighbors, it is immediately moved into the recovered class. 
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SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSIS
Network Properties of Demographic Groups 
Here we describe basic properties of the simulated urban networks that we have analyzed.  The 
epidemiological calculations consider the degree distribution of the network (as described in the 
previous section.)  Recall that most of the edges in our network are undirected and many 
individuals have the same out-degree as in-degree, with the exception of health care workers and 
individuals who are at high risk for complications due to flu.  In Figure S1, we show the in-
degree distributions for the total population and select demographic groups before and after 
vaccination by the morbidity and mortality-based strategies.  Children have a much higher mean 
in-degree (24.1) than adults and elders (10.7 and 10.6, respectively).  Figure S1c illustrates that 
the contact patterns for adults are relatively unaffected by both the morbidity- and mortality-
based strategies.  The morbidity-based strategy primarily alters the degree distribution of 
children (Figure S1b) and the mortality-based strategy primarily alters the degree distribution of 
elders (Figure S1d).  The mortality-based strategy does not affect the degree distribution of the 
total population a great deal (Figure S1a) as it effectively only targets small groups, either due to 
low vaccine efficacy levels (elders) or few individuals in the demographic group (infants.) 
Sensitivity to Population Structure 
The urban networks are stochastically generated, yielding Poisson distributions of contact 
numbers within each setting (schools, hospitals, workplaces, etc.). To achieve this, we specify 
setting-specific probabilities that determine whether or not any given pair of individuals in the 
same location will have an edge drawn between them. We examined the sensitivity of our results 
to the specific probabilities used in generating the network.  First, we generate 100 networks 
11
each with 5000 households.  (The smaller population size allowed for more extensive sensitivity 
analyses. In prior studies, we found that epidemiological predictions for small urban networks 
apply to large urban networks [S5], and thus we expect that these sensitivity results will also 
apply to large networks.)  To generate variation in these networks, we draw contact probabilities 
between individuals from a Gaussian distribution, and allow them to deviate by up to 100% from 
the original contact parameters (which range from 0.003 to 0.3 depending on the location/nature 
of the interaction).  The stochastic formation of edges according to these probabilities yields 100 
unique networks, each with its own degree distribution.  We then vaccinate each population 
according to the morbidity-based and mortality-based strategies, as described in the methods 
section. The dashed lines in Figure S2 indicate the standard deviations for each epidemiological 
prediction (morbidity and mortality) across the 100 networks. The small variation in the 
predictions indicates that our results are robust to stochastic variation in network structure.  Even 
with a 100% deviation in contact structure, the morbidity and mortality-based strategies are 
superior for lower and higher values of T, respectively.  The value of T at which preferred 
strategy switches falls in the range [0.10, 0.14].  In the main text, we report a transition point of 
T=0.11.  These results suggest that even a 100% uncertainty in contact rates produces an 
uncertainty of [-0.01, 0.03] around the transition point. 
Sensitivity to Mortality Rates  
To evaluate the sensitivity of our predictions to variations in virulence among different strains of 
influenza, we evaluated vaccination strategies for two markedly different estimated mortality 
distributions. Here we extend this analysis to several other estimated influenza mortality 
distributions.  We compare the total mortality caused by an influenza epidemic after the 
12
population has been vaccinated with a morbidity-based or mortality-based strategy for five 
different age-specific mortality distributions.  The first two mortality distributions are the focus 
of the main text.  The third is a different estimate for 1918 flu mortality rates that includes high 
mortality rates for adults and the elderly; and the remaining two are U-shaped mortality 
distributions reported for the epidemics of 1892 and 1936 [S8].  The mortality-based strategy is 
designed to target the demographic groups with the highest mortality rates, and thus varies from 
one mortality distribution to the next. The morbidity-based strategy is identical across all five 
mortality distributions, targeting school children and staff as specified in the main text.  We are 
particularly interested the cross-points (in transmissibility values) where the mortality-based 
strategy becomes superior to the morbidity-based strategy.  These lie between T = 0.15 and T = 
0.20 for the three additional mortality distributions shown in Figure S3, very close to that 
predicted for the 1918 mortality distribution considered in the main text, further suggesting that 
the results are fairly insensitive to uncertainties in estimates of influenza mortality rates. 
Sensitivity to Vaccine Coverage Level 
We test the sensitivity of our results to a change in the vaccine coverage level.  The vaccine 
priorities in the main text are implemented at a 13% coverage level.  Here, we implement the 
morbidity-based strategy (school children and staff) and mortality-based strategy (based on the 
second mortality distribution of Figure S3) at a 20% coverage level. (During the influenza 
vaccine shortage of 2004, enough vaccine was available to cover 20% of the population.)   
Figure S4 shows that the increase in vaccination coverage produces a smaller mortality rate for 
both strategies but the comparison is qualitatively similar:  the mortality-based strategy 
outperforms the morbidity-based strategy for higher values of transmissibility. 
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Vaccine Effectiveness and Efficacy 
Vaccine efficacy is defined as E = 1 – (attack rate among vaccinated population/attack rate 
among unvaccinated population). To model vaccination of a proportion C of a demographic 
group at an efficacy of E, we remove a fraction C*E of individuals in the group from the network 
entirely. This reduces the attack rate in the vaccinated group by exactly a fraction E, which yields 
an efficacy of E. Although this method technically assumes that the vaccine has 100% 
effectiveness for the fraction E of the vaccinated group and no effectiveness on the remaining 
fraction 1-E of vaccinated individuals, it provides a reasonable model for the more realistic 
scenario in which most vaccinate individuals enjoy some level of protection. To test that the 
100% effectiveness model is a reasonable approximation, we have compared its predictions to 
simulations in which all vaccinated individuals have partially reduced susceptibility. In 
particular, to vaccinate a fraction C of a group with a vaccine of efficacy E > 0, we select C
individuals at random from the group and reduce the transmission probability along all edges 
leading to each of those individuals by a factor
1/(1 )
(1 )
mE
T b

 , where m is the undirected 
degree of the node, T is the average transmissibility, and b is the average probability that an 
individual at the end of a randomly selected undirected edge is spared by an epidemic.  This 
factor is based on the fact that the probability of infection for each vaccinated individual will be 
1-E, and this yields a reduction in the attack rate in the group of E. We then simulate the spread 
of disease through the network. We find that mathematical predictions assuming 100% 
effectiveness closely match the results of these simulations, as illustrated in Figure S5. 
Sensitivity to Variation in Infectivity and Susceptibility 
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There is certainly heterogeneity in influenza infectivity and susceptibility among individuals.  
Some of the heterogeneity is caused by variation in contact patterns [S9].  Individuals with more 
contacts will have greater opportunities to catch and spread disease. Our models explicitly 
capture this source of variation.  The remaining heterogeneity in transmission rates is caused by 
intrinsic physiological and behavioral differences among individuals.  Our analytical calculations 
allow for such heterogeneity so long as it is distributed somewhat randomly with respect to the 
structure of the population.  That is, there should not be significant correlations between 
individual contact patterns and individual likelihoods of infection and/or transmission.  There is 
evidence, however, that such correlations may exist. Cauchemez et al. statistically argue that 
children have a higher infectiousness and a higher susceptibility than adults per contact [S10].
We have modified our contact network to explicitly model this diversity in 
transmissibility.  Cauchemez et al. suggest that, within a household, susceptible children (under 
15 years of age) have a 15% higher susceptibility per day of contact with an infectious household 
member compared to susceptible adults. They estimate that infectious children have 84% higher 
infectivity per day of contact with susceptible household members compared to infectious adults 
(0.26 and 0.48 for adults and children, respectively).  Finally, they find that the expected 
infectious periods of flu for children and adults are 3.6 and 3.9 days, respectively [S10].
To test the sensitivity of our model to such heterogeneity, we make the extreme 
assumption that the different transmission probabilities will also hold for contacts outside the 
home. Accordingly, contacts between children were given the highest probability of transmission 
(TCC), followed by those from children to adults (TCA), from adults to children (TAC), and finally 
between adults (TAA). We assigned probabilities of transmission to the edges in the network 
based on the ratios between these values calculated from the data reported in [S10]. In particular, 
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each transmissibility is the average probability of transmission between an infectious and 
susceptible individual during the infectious period, or 1 (1 )p W   where Ĳ is the length of the 
infectious period and p is the per day probability of infection. Borrowing notation from [S10], 
for an edge pointing from an infected individual of type I (child or adult) to a susceptible 
individual of type J (child or adult) this is equal to 1 1 EIH J W I where EI is the per day 
probability of transmission from I to one of his or her contacts, W I  is the duration of I’s
infectious period, and HJ  is the susceptibility factor of individual J. The table below gives the 
ratios that we used to determine transmissibilities in the model.  
Contact Type 
(I o J) 
Transmissibility calculated from 
estimates reported [S10] 
1 1 EIH J W I
Ratio of
TIJ to TAA
Adult o Adult 1 1 0.26 3.9 1
Adult o Child 1 1 0.26 1.15 3.9 1.09
Child o Adult 1 1 0.48 3.6 1.31
Child o Child 1 1 0.48 1.15 3.6 1.37
           For a range of possible values for TAA, we assigned transmissibilities according to these 
ratios and ran 250 SIR simulations on the network for each of three scenarios: no vaccination, 
mortality-based vaccination, and morbidity-based vaccination. We also calculated the average 
transmissibility T across all contacts in the network, with which we made analytical predictions.  
In Figure S6, we compare analytical predictions that consider only the average transmissibility T
(lines) to the outcome of these simulations (circles). Our current analytic methods give 
qualitatively similar results to those of the simulations. Although there is a bit of a discrepancy 
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between the predicted and simulated results for the morbidity-based strategy and consequently 
for the transition point between the two strategies, the important results still hold. That is, the 
mortality-based strategy remains advisable over a large range of highly contagious strains (even 
larger in the simulations than the analytics), and the cross-point between the two strategies 
remains within the range of estimates of R0 for interpandemic flu. 
Although the results in Figure S6 may seem counter-intuitive, they point to some of the 
important features of our model.   Generally, the morbidity-based strategy reduces mortality via 
herd immunity while the mortality-based strategy reduces mortality by directly protecting those 
with highest mortality rates. By assuming that edges to and from children have higher 
transmissibilities, it becomes more difficult to achieve herd immunity via the morbidity-based 
strategy. Despite the fact that the morbidity-based strategy targets a core group (50% of all 
children), it leaves a substantial population of children with high degree and high infectiousness 
which continues to act as a core group sufficient enough to reach the high-risk individuals.  The 
mortality-based strategy is relatively unaffected by the heterogeneity because it continues to 
protect the same fraction of high-risk individuals (in neither case does it achieve much herd 
immunity). 
This sensitivity analysis was based on a fairly extreme form of heterogeneity in 
transmission probabilities. In reality, variation in transmission probabilities outside households 
may be less demographically-structured, in which case, the assumption that variation in 
transmission probabilities is fairly random with respect to network structure may be valid. 
Similar analytic methods that explicitly capture demographic-specific patterns of transmission 
rates give more exact predictions for this extreme scenario, but are beyond the scope of this 
paper.
17
References 
S1. Household Size, census metropolitan areas. Statistics Canada (2001) 
S2. 2001 Census Profile of British Columbia’s Regions: Greater Vancouver Regional 
District, BC Stats (2003) 
S3. Vancouver School Board, December 2002 Ready Reference (2002). 
S4. The British Columbia Health Atlas, Centre for Health Services and Policy Research 
(2002)
S5. Pourbohloul B, Meyers LA, Skowronski DM, Krajden M, Patrick DM, et al. (2005) 
Modeling Control Strategies of Respiratory Pathogens. Emerg Infect Dis. 11: 1249-1256 
S6. Meyers LA, Newman MEJ, Pourbohloul B (2006) Predicting epidemics on directed 
contact networks.  JTB.  In press. 
S7.  Newman MEJ (2002) Spread of epidemic disease on network. Phys. Rev. E 66, 016128  
S8. Dauer CC, Serfling RE (1961) Mortality from Influenza, 1957-1958 and 1959-1960.  Am 
Rev Respir Dis.  83 (2 Suppl): 15-26. 
S9. Addy CL, Longini IM, Harber M (1991) A Generalized Stochastic Model for the 
Analysis of Infectious Disease Final Size Data.  Biometrics. 47: 961-974. 
S10. Cauchemez S, Carrat F, Viboud C, Valleron AJ, Boelle PY (2004)  A Bayesian MCMC 
approach to study transmission of influenza: application to household longitudinal data.
Stat Med. 23: 3469-3487. 
S11. Thompson WW, Shay DK, Weintraub E, Brammer L, Cox N et al. (2003) Mortality 
associated with influenza and respiratory syncytial virus in the United States. JAMA. 
289: 179–86. 
S12.  Simonsen L, Clarke MJ, Schonberger LB, Arden NH, Cox NJ et al. (1998) Pandemic 
versus epidemic influenza mortality: a pattern of changing age distribution. J Infect Dis. 
178: 53–60. 
18
Figure S1: (Normalized) Degree distributions for various demographic groups before and after 
vaccination (with the interpandemic mortality-based strategy and the morbidity-based strategy.)  
Vaccinated individuals are not included in the distributions shown for the two strategies.
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Figure S2: Variation in the size of epidemic and total mortality predicted for mortality-based 
(red) and morbidity-based (green) strategies across 100 networks with 100% variation in contact 
parameters.  Dashed lines indicate standard deviations. 
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Figure S3: Epidemiological predictions for five different estimated influenza mortality 
distributions. Left: Mortality rates estimated for various influenza epidemics and pandemics [S8, 
S11, S12].  The top two distributions are considered in the main text. Right: Total mortality 
predicted for the mortality-based strategy (red) and morbidity-based strategy (green) assuming 
the corresponding distributions of mortality rates. 
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Figure S4:  The total mortality at a 20% vaccination coverage level.  The total mortality is lower 
for both strategies as compared to vaccination at a 13% coverage level (dashed lines).  However, 
there still exists a point after which the mortality-based strategy is superior to the morbidity-
based.
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Figure S5:  Results from simulation demonstrate that the two methods of modeling vaccine 
efficacy give similar results. Results are shown for the mortality-based and morbidity-based 
strategies. ‘Partial effectiveness’ refers to the vaccination of a proportion C of the population 
with effectiveness E.  ‘100% effectiveness’ refers to the vaccination of a proportion C*E of the 
population with effectiveness 1. 
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Figure S6: Results for total mortality rate with variation in infectivity and susceptibility.  The x-
axis corresponds to the average transmissibility across all edges in the network. Circles are 
simulation results with individual variation in infectivity and susceptibility; lines are analytical 
results for the resulting average transmissibility on the same networks. The analytical 
calculations do not explicitly consider variation in infectivity and susceptibility on each edge. 
